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ABSTRACT:  Drawing upon a recent review of the topic by Cross and Tolbert 
(2009), this paper briefly illustrates the diversity of theories concerning the nature of 
meanings in music and the challenges that need to be resolved to advance the field. A 
scheme for layered macro- and micro-theories for neural, mental and behavioural 
systems is outlined to facilitate the development of a systematic and coherent body of 
theory. The core of the paper charts the evolutionary origins of a specific macro-
theory of the organisation all the components of the human mind. This  “mental 
architecture,” known as Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (Barnard, 1985), 
incorporates not one, but two qualitatively distinct forms of meaning. Propositional 
meanings represent referentially specific ideas while implicational meanings 
encapsulate a yet more abstract and holistic form of meaning that blends conceptual 
material with the products of immediate distal and bodily sensations. While both 
forms of meaning interact in the interpretation and expression of musical meaning, 
such meanings are argued to be primarily implicational in nature. The paper 
concludes with a short discussion of how this approach might usefully be applied in 
the development of more precise specification of what music might mean in its 
various facets. 
 
Submitted 2012 January 6; accepted 2012 July 13. 
 
KEYWORDS: meaning, mental architecture, Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
 
 
IF you were informally to ask a sample of people in the street whether or not music meant something to 
them, it would be surprising if most did not rapidly answer in the affirmative. Music, after all, is 
pervasive in our modern culture and the cultures of our immediate forebears. Ask a sample of music 
experts or theoreticians and the answers would most probably neither be short nor uniform. The whole 
idea of the “meaning” of music is far from easy to pin down. As Cross and Tolbert (2009) note, issues 
that surround the nature of musical meaning have been central to the ways in which music has been 
explored and theorised. Yet, in spite of extensive debate there is little consensus. 
 
MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF MUSICAL MEANING 
 
In their perceptive review of proposals concerning meaning in music Cross and Tolbert (2009) draw 
our attention to numerous limitations of current positions and the challenges that the field must resolve. 
Meaning in music has multiple dimensions.  Music definitely has “significance,” and that significance 
can often only be grasped by considering the social context or culture in which a particular kind of 
music is enacted (Feld & Fox, 1994).  They also point out that music cannot so readily be seen to refer 
to an entity, property or relationship in quite the same way as language. Formal theories of semantics 
with a basis in logic (e.g. see Scruton, 1987) do not seem to be in position to provide a pertinent 
account of musical meaning. Equally, while variants of Pierce’s classic semiotic distinctions between 
meanings rooted in iconic, indexical and symbolic relationships have also been applied to music (see 
Nattiez, 1991), Cross and Tolbert note that the status of music is ambiguous with respect to the 
categories at the heart of this framework. Yet other approaches to meaning propose that it is first and 
foremost grounded in bodily experiences (e.g. Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). This, in turn, provides a 
route to addressing specific phenomena such as entrainment. Nor has emotion been neglected. From 
classical times to the present, music can be shown to evoke affect (Juslin & Sloboda, 2001). Musical 
meaning has even been linked to specific neural circuits also activated by linguistic meanings perhaps 
involving some common mediating factor such as imagery (Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008).  
The challenges of resolving musical meaning, Cross and Tolbert argue, are unlikely to be met 
by one generally applicable theory or even by a single method. We are going to need new approaches 
within the psychological sciences that suggest ways of addressing meanings that are inherent or 
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emergent in musical interactions and which also aim to account for meaning within an evolutionary 
framework (e.g. see Cross & Woodruff, 2009). These challenges are by no means easy to address in a 
simple way – the significant number of attributes of musical meaning effectively call for a suite of 
theories that inter-relate not only diverse components of mind, but also show how those components of 
mind are constrained by human interactions with physical and animate entities as well as by the neural 
systems that underpin them.  
 
MEANING, SYSTEM LEVELS AND MACRO-THEORY 
 
Following Barnard, May, Duke & Duce (2000), Figure 1 shows three levels at which pertinent systems 
can be analysed. These are neural architecture, mental architecture and behavioural architecture. Each 
level is an assembly (A) of basic units (B’s) that themselves can each be decomposed into constituents 
(C). The basic units of mental architecture are processes, the basic unit of neural architecture 
electrochemical circuits and the basic units of behavioural architecture are animate agents and the 
physical entities they interact with in some setting – here they are musical instruments. Of course, 
defining the things that interact in a system is only a point of departure for formulating theories of how 
these systems actually behave – we also need to specify what the capabilities of the individual B’s and 
C’s are, what requirements need to be met for those capabilities to be used and the principles that 
govern the dynamic control and co-ordination of their changes of state - be those changes 




Fig. 1: Three system levels relevant to analyses of the nature of musical meanings. 
 
While we are a long way from having theories of these systems that are either descriptively or 
explanatorily adequate, Figure 1 draws attention to two dimensions of theory formation. One 
dimension is captured by double-headed vertical arrows annotated “macro-theory” and “micro-theory.” 
In the case of mental architecture micro-theories are theories of specific mental competences, or how 
the behaviour of the “B’s” is bottom-up constrained by properties of their “C’s.”  The “B’s” might be 
perception, language, attention, learning and memory or motor skills and there is often overlap in what 
these micro-theories address. Mainstream psychological science has focussed most of its effort on 
developing micro-theories at the expense of trying to formulate theories of how all of our mental 
competences work together. Furthermore, few theorists would agree on the exact categories of “B’s” or 
“C’s we should be using.  
Many of the limitations of approaches to musical meaning summarised earlier can be traced 
back to the fact that the specific ideas tend to have been grounded in one or another micro-theoretic 
tradition. All of the different cognitive and affective attributes that have been debated in this context 
would seem to require resolution within macro-theory rather than by a collection of micro-theories that 
may be mutually irreconcilable. Horizontal doubled headed arrows, the second dimension of theory, 
indicate systematic relationship between analyses at different system levels. You can obviously have 
the same mental architecture embedded in very different behavioural architectures (or cultures). 
Variation in the capabilities and workings of mental architecture will be grounded in experience in a 
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physical world of behavioural interactions and correlates of those experiences will propagate across all 
the basic components of mental architecture and the neural substrates on which they depend. 
This paper will offer a way addressing issues associated with musical meaning from the 
specific perspective of a macro-theory of human mental architecture and how it evolved from a simpler 
form of mental architecture typical of most mammals. The analysis considers two qualitatively 
different types of meaning originally proposed by Barnard and Teasdale (1991) to analyse relationships 
between cognition, affect and embodiment. One form of meaning relates to the encoding of 
“propositions,” whilst the other blends ideas, externally derived percepts and bodily experience to form 
“implicational meanings.” These are more abstract schemata or models of deep multimodal 
interdependences that equate more with latent senses of meaning or knowing as well as feelings, 
intuitions and affect. Propositional and implicational meanings co-exist in mental architecture and 
depend one upon the other. While language skills are more clearly focussed on the form and expression 
of propositional meanings, musical expertise and aesthetic appreciation links most readily to 
implicational meanings.  
To situate the arguments detailed below, music and language require both forms of meaning to 
interact. Musical meanings are best elaborated as the communication and appreciation of latent 
implicational meanings that are realised in interactions among multiple components of mental 
architecture, including propositional meanings. In relation to Figure 1, the actual realisations of these 
two types of meaning are in part constrained by influences from a specific culture (behavioural 
architecture), and in part by the evolutionary origins of our electrochemical circuitry (neural 
architecture). 
 
THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF PROPOSITIONAL AND IMPLICATIONAL 
MEANINGS 
 
Many of the issues addressed in debates about musical meanings find direct parallels in analyses of 
psychopathologies where specific concepts and abstract feelings about self and others, emotions and 
embodiment all need to be factored into a comprehensive macro-theoretic account of mechanisms 
leading to, and sustaining, a particular condition such as depression. The distinction between 
propositional and implicational meanings has been most extensively elaborated in this context  
(Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), while the evolutionary origins of these two forms of meaning and their 
processing has also been specified in some technical detail (Barnard, Duke, Byrne, & Davidson, 2007; 
Barnard, 2010).  Here, key aspects of the arguments will be summarised with an emphasis on those 
features most relevant to issues associated with inter-relating meaning and music. 
Figure 2 diagrammatically depicts four subsystems  (the B’s of figure 1). This arrangement is 
proposed as the configuration of the minds of those mammals, such as wolves, that lack sophisticated 
cognitive capabilities (Barnard et al., 2007).  There are three sensory subsystems (visual, body-state 
and acoustic) and a single multimodal subsystem highlighted in black. Information flows one way in 
this architecture from physical sensors through the sensory subsystems to the multimodal subsystem. 
This, in turn, controls what the effector systems of the body actually do. Naturally, each of these 
subsystems has constituent processes (the C’s of Figure 1) detailed in other papers. Here, it is sufficient 
to note that this particular theory holds that each subsystem has its own memory and a dynamic 
“image” of the patterning of information over time, such as a tree branch waving in the wind. The 
information in that image can be attended to selectively and its content is the substance of what 
mammals can subjectively experience as “out there in the world” or “in the body” (sensory subsystems) 
or as more abstract senses or feelings (Multimodal subsystem). 





Fig. 2: A Four-subsystem mental architecture argued to hold for most mammals lacking any 
sophisticated cognitive capabilities. The abbreviations Som and Visc stand for Somatic and Visceral 
response systems in this and later figures. 
 
On this view the individual subsystems each learn about what goes with what in the images 
they receive on the basis of rather simple statistical mechanisms – something like a principal 
components analysis with time as one of its dimensions (see Barnard et al., 2007 for details).  So the 
sensory subsystems will effectively “do” perceptual learning for visual patterns, patterns of bodily 
sensation and auditory patterns while the multimodal subsystem will take the products of all those 
sensory analyses and “do” a higher order principal components analysis of deeper more abstract 
relationships of the kind that have been extensively studied in the paradigms of classical and 
instrumental conditioning. This tunes animal mental mechanisms to react adaptively in similar ways to 
things or events with similar properties and in different ways to things, events or circumstances that are 
different. Importantly, and in common with many other views proposing that emotion modules or 
programmes originally evolved to support the adaptive control of action (e.g. see Tooby & Cosmides, 
2000), affective markers of, for example, gratification, safety, or discomfort will guide selection of 
what to do from within a repertoire of fixed action patterns.  
The multimodal subsystem of this architecture is building quite sophisticated “schemata” or 
statistical “models” of how to react in intricate context-dependent physical and social worlds whose 
precise characteristics can alter over time. These models must capture the essence of what goes with 
what and inherently assess the “significance” of current states along with when and how to react to 
them. A strong case can be made that the deep signature of this architecture has been preserved in an 
augmented form in our own more evolved mental architecture and that implicational meanings are 
rooted in the stuff of very basic multi-modal relationships that are carried through into the human 
appreciation of music. The fundamental properties of sights and sounds tell us a great deal about 
objects events and places (e.g. Jenkins 1985) as well as how to act in relation to them. Physics dictates 
that large or heavy objects, for example, will vibrate at low frequencies and smaller and lighter ones at 
higher frequencies. Many multimodal relationships of this type exist that animals and humans can 
make use of. 
 
 





Fig 3: Multimodal patterns perhaps involving an abstraction inter-relating “acute” as opposed to soft or 
gentle transitions in vision, audition and body states with positive and negative affective markers. 
 
It has been known for a long time that we humans capitalise on abstract properties of our 
multimodal experience. The upper part Figure 3 shows two graphics. Davis (1961) originally showed 
that young children from markedly different cultures across the world reliably associate the novel non-
word sounds of Takete with the novel jagged shape and the sound of novel non-words like Ulumoo or 
Maluma with the equally novel more rounded and billowing shape. Similar regularities apply with 
known as opposed to novel words – expletives are quite likely to involve “hard” consonants while 
words of love tend to involve rather softer vowel sounds. More likely than not people would link 
Takete to the sound of breaking glass and Ulumoo to the more melodic sound of gentle waves lapping 
on a beach. It has recently been shown that the same considerations apply to associations between 
tastes and the sounds of words (Gallace, Boschin, & Spence, 2011).  Similar abstractions occur with 
movements involving purely abstract shapes (Heider & Simmel, 1944). Abstract shapes moving in 
together in smooth and perhaps embracing patterns are interpreted as representing agents in contexts of 
social affiliation while those moving with abrupt stabbing movements are interpreted as behaviours 
more typical of antagonist social contexts (Tavares, Lawrence and Barnard, 2008). Jagged objects like 
shards of glass or thorns can pierce the skin and cause discomfort while stroking fur or being enveloped 
in soft billowing cushions is more likely to be a source of comfort. These are deep configural properties 
that enter into dendritic relationships rather than superficial properties of cleanly delineated scope. At 
best, we can over-simplify the essence of such patterns as involving families of “acute transition-
discomfort” relationships or families of “smooth transition-comfort” relationships. 
We experience such cognitive-affective patterns as systematic ‘senses or feelings’ that yield 
reliable and measurable behaviours yet are extraordinarily difficult to realise as specific propositional 
meanings (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). By extension we use linguistic phrases like “he has a sharp 
tongue” or “that is well-rounded argument” to convey intricate, and in this case, evaluative meanings. 
However, while the dimensions of deep schemata can be richly expressed in language through 
metaphor and other rhetorical devices, the actual multimodal regularities that give rise to them may 
encompass many dimensions that can only be captured through some high dimensional statistical 
analysis such as latent semantic analysis (e.g. Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  
It would seem reasonable to argue that abstraction and modelling of significant aspects of the 
“acute-transition-discomfort” patterns and “smooth transition-comfort” patterns across sights, sounds 
and bodily sensations would be well within the modelling capabilities of the multimodal component of 
the four-subsystem architecture shown in Figure 2. Similarly, the sounds of slow irregular footfall of a 
small deer, coupled with the sight of asymmetric biological motion, could come to be yoked as 
signifying a more rather than less vulnerable prey, perhaps with a weakness or injury, and hence a good 
prospect to target in a hunt.  The examples in Figure 3 that rely on non-words, expletives and the 
interpretation of abstract shapes “behaving” in cartoon movies would be unlikely to apply in four-
subsystem wolf cognition, since the architecture of its mind lacks basic units to support the processing 
of more advanced forms of spatial, linguistic and semantic imagery.  
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The core argument proposed by Barnard et al. (2007) is that spatial, linguistic and semantic 
imagery and their allied processes emerged out of an evolutionary trajectory in which five new 
subsystems were added to the configuration shown in Figure 2. At each stage, in a pattern not unlike 
cell division in biology, the original Multimodal subsystem spawns a new daughter subsystem. Each 
addition results in a new configuration that brings a package of mental and behavioural capabilities and 
each addition changes the content of, and differentiation within, the multimodal syntheses that underpin 
cognition and affect. Here key features of that trajectory will be summarised, the details of semantic 
and affective differentiation and the emergence of intricate attentional and “executive” processes have 
been fully documented elsewhere (Barnard, 2010; Barnard et al., 2007; Byrne et al., 2004). 
Figure 4 shows an architecture in which the core components of our original four-subsystem 
architecture are augmented by four new ones and the order of addition is indexed by the white number 
sequence at the lower right of each of the boxes filled in grey. The principles proposed for subsystem 
differentiation entail a single trajectory of architectural evolution from our last common ancestor with 
extant great apes. When following the ensuing text, it is important to note that descriptions of, for 
example, a six-subsystem architecture effectively invite readers to imagine a variant of this Figure in 




Fig 4: An eight-subsystem architecture for the immediate hominin ancestors of modern humans 
(simplified from Barnard et al., 2007). 
 
The first segment of the overall trajectory involves the development of more advanced skills 
in “spatial-praxis” and its internal representation. First, some precursor species of monkey is presumed 
to have evolved intricate manual dexterity and the detailed control of finger movement in the context of 
wider skeletal musculatures – such re-configurations of balance required when reaching to twist off a 
fruit. The product of this differentiation would have been a new subsystem specialised for the control 
of skeletal effectors (Figure 4, box indexed 5).  
Importantly, once in place, the temporal patterning of skeletal re-configurations controlled by 
this effector subsystem would be sensed within the body-state subsystem and their first order 
patternings, or derivatives, sent on to the Multimodal subsystem. In parallel, of course, the monkey 
would be “seeing” the action and the first order derivatives of the dynamic changes in visual patterning 
would also be sent to the Multimodal subsystem. Here the underlying neural networks would be able to 
abstract properties of the changes that were shared by both vision and body state dynamics – abstract 
invariants relating to, for example, twisting, inverting, timing, size reduction and so on. These 
abstractions would initially form the seeds of a “spatial-praxic” coding system.  Once a fully 
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differentiated coding system stabilises, a new daughter subsystem would emerge (Figure 4, box 
indexed 6). The technical details of the differentiation are given in Barnard et al. (2007). Of note here is 
the fact that the new sixth subsystem inter-mediates between vision, effector control and multimodal 
synthesis. It represents a gateway for the interpretation of visual patterns over time as well as their 
implementation as actions in the world.  Spatial-praxic encodings represent that part of the original 
multimodal subsystem concerned with something akin to deeper “structural descriptions” of changes in 
visual states and how to realise them in muscular control. Three critical new capabilities underpinning 
the behaviour of mental architecture emerge at this point.  
First, there is a new level of abstraction – the multimodal subsystem now receives information 
that has undergone two preceding types of analysis.  The first order sensory analysis is followed by a 
more abstract spatial-praxic analysis before being passed to the multimodal subsystem. Whereas the 
four-subsystem architecture had just two levels of analysis the multimodal component of a six-
subsystem architecture can now compute a third level of abstraction that relates actions in physical 
space to other multimodal elements.  
Second, the four-subsystem architecture involved what amounts to one-way traffic from 
sensation to action control. The six-subsystem architecture now supports an internal cycle – a 
reciprocal mapping between the processing of multimodal images and spatial-praxic ones. This mental 
architecture has a form of visual imagery that can occur concurrently with the control of overt action 
and supports “re-ordering” of action elements. This architecture can “think” spatially while doing. 
Third, the now deeper derivatives of abstract structural descriptions of actions in space (i.e. movement 
phrases) can be linked with affect in the multimodal subsystem rather than just similarities in 
movement based on first order sensations. This architecture can in principle have a feeling about 
gestures that share a common abstract composition. 
These three properties, Barnard et al., (2007) argue, are sufficient to account for the more 
advanced capabilities of modern great apes – including programme level imitation of food processing, 
tool use, advanced working memory for visual sequences, mirror image recognition of “self,” some 
theory of mind for the actions of others, and the cultural transmission of certain forms of almost dance-
like and non-food related actions carried out in affectively marked contexts. All of these are arguably 
grounded in purely spatial-praxic skills and were all in place in the minds of our last common ancestor 
with extant great apes. 
Great apes are known to have a restricted range of vocalisation, as would our last common 
ancestor. The case advanced by Barnard et al. (2007) is that the process simply repeated in the 
auditory-vocal domain for other hominins from whom we are descended. First, as with manual 
dexterity, differentiation of vocal utterances spawned an articulatory subsystem (Figure 4, box indexed 
7) for the intricate and co-ordinated control of multiple muscular components: vocal cords, lips, tongue, 
timing of breath etc. Once in place the internal bodily feedback of changes allied to vocalisation can be 
inter-related within the Multimodal subsystem with what is heard, not only in “speech by self,” but 
with speech and related sounds generated by others.  Just as with the emergence of a spatial-praxic 
coding system, the invariants underlying vocal articulation and heard sound lead to the emergence of a 
“morphonolexical” subsystem (Figure 4, box indexed 8). This captures abstract structural descriptions 
of utterances, allows mental imagery of sounds and voices “in the head,” decomposition and re-
ordering of the elements of vocal phrases and the assignment of emotion to abstract properties of what 
is said as well as what is seen. This architecture has a form of productive linguistic communication.  
The full eight-subsystem architecture of Figure 4 can do a lot more at one and the same time 
than the four-subsystem architecture of Figure 2 could do. In principle, it could give really quite 
complex verbal “instructions” while visually demonstrating the actions required in manufacturing a 
spear or stone tool. In this architecture, both vocal and skeletal actions are centrally co-ordinated from 
a single multimodal subsystem. Actions of others could be vocally rewarded or discouraged. The 
deepest abstraction within the Multimodal subsystem remains at three levels. However, the third level 
now inter-relates abstract structural descriptions of re-orderable visual dynamics and verbal inputs with 
their affect and cognitive significances. This is a key precondition for the final emergence of truly 
abstract semantic roles. 
As with each of the prior stages along this hypothetical evolutionary trajectory, the 
multimodal subsystem operates by seeking to establish and make use of invariant patterning underlying 
the inputs it receives. With the four subsystem architecture these would be confined to the here and 
now of sensory properties relevant for selecting among fixed action patterns. With the six-subsystem 
architecture, the demands of, for example, tool manufacture would require distinguishing physical 
properties of cores and hammer stones. Action selections guided by multimodal distinctions would 
have to be made in the partitioning of meat or fruit by slicing with a stone flake or partitioning kernels 
from nutshells by pounding a hammer onto a nut located on an anvil and so on. Byrne et al. (2004) note 
that distinctions among the generic semantic roles proposed in case grammars (e.g. Fillmore, 1968) 
such as agent, object, or instrument roles, as well as other semantic properties, are implicit in the 
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behaviours of chimpanzees but their presence does not mean we have to propose that they really rely 




Fig. 5: Propositional and implicational meaning within the nine-subsystem architecture proposed for 
our own mental architecture (simplified from Barnard et al., 2007). 
 
The eight-subsystem architecture is the crucible in which a truly abstract semantic coding 
system can be forged. Here the inputs to the Multimodal subsystem now include the products of 
analysing invariant structures in spatial-praxic dynamics and invariants underlying phonologically 
expressed phrases. Further, the referent of arbitrary phonological forms can only be grasped by 
intersecting invariant patterns that have that have systematically co-occurred within the Multimodal 
subsystem. The product is a semantic coding system for propositional meanings.  Something like the 
case grammar distinctions implicit in chimpanzee behaviour come to form a stable coding system and 
enable a final, ninth daughter subsystem to emerge that explicitly represents propositional meanings 
(Figure 5). 
The emergence of the ninth subsystem brings with it an enormous step change in cognitive 
capability. As with the emergence of the sixth subsystem, the transition to nine subsystems endows the 
architecture with the capability to abstract deeper regularities. These can now be four layers rather than 
three layers “deep.” The longest chain of processing now goes though sensory subsystems (1st order 
abstraction), through a layer of structural description (2nd order abstraction), followed by propositional 
analysis (3rd order abstraction), and into a final multimodal synthesis of 4th order abstract patterns that 
underlie recurrent patterns in propositional meanings that are blended with the products of sensory 
processing (Vision, Body-states and Audition). At the outset it was pointed out that the analysis would 
show that the minds of modern humans retained the signature of the four-subsystem architecture of 
Figure 2. To mark this continuity, the implicational subsystem of Figure 5 retains the black shading of 
all its evolutionary precursors and the original flows from the three sensory subsystems. As with all 
previous transitions affect is retained in its original place – except now the markers of affect can attach 
not just abstractions of external states but to abstract ideas about the self, the world and others.  
The owner of this architecture can feel success and failure in addition to the more basic 
emotions. In this scheme propositional meanings lack affective charge and the wider system can 
support multiple meanings. As Teasdale and Barnard (1993) point out, the depressed owner of a nine-
subsystem architecture can “feel in their hearts” all of the implicational markers of “self-as-failure” 
whilst propositionally knowing “in their head” that they have attributes of success that are indisputably 
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“true.” The implicational meaning system of the nine-subsystem architecture supplements information 
directly derived from the senses with conceptually derived information. It has not only “feelings” about 
intricate states, the content of those implicational mental states are the stuff of abstractions underlying 
knowledge – intuitions, wisdom and deep expertise in, for example, science, chess, literature and, of 
course, art, religion, dance or music.  
The emergence of the ninth subsystem also brings the ability for the human mind to do more 
things at one and the same time. The interaction between propositional and implicational meanings has 
been referred to as the “central engine of human ideation” (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). This enables 
the owner of this kind of architecture to think about ideas whilst walking, talking and chewing gum. 
The basic units are configured in a way that enables a modern human to think about how to make a 
better tool, whilst physically making the tool and humming a song at the same time. Within the 
dialogue between propositional and implicational meanings, the elements of ‘ideas’ can routinely be 
formed, re-composed and re-organised into either recurrent patterns known to be useful or into novel 
innovative forms that can be evaluated in mental simulation or by testing them in a real-world context 
of actual rather than imagined behavioural architectures.  
A seven-subsystem architecture was most likely in place for one or more species of Homo 
during the era of H. erectus, while later archaic species such as H. heidelbergensis and H. 
neanderthalensis are argued to have possessed eight-subsystem minds. Only H. sapiens sapiens is 
regarded as having developed the full complement of nine-subsystems with two qualitatively distinct 
types of meaning. 
 
MACRO-THEORIES, MUSIC AND MEANINGS 
 
The nine-subsystem architecture thus defines the components of a candidate macro-theory for the 
modern human mind (the B’s of Figure 2) and how they are configured as an architectural assembly 
(A). The allied definitions of the coding systems constrain how we formulate more specific claims 
about our mental capabilities and potential. It is a candidate theory that has seen applications in a 
number of areas within basic and applied theory (e.g. see Barnard, 1999; Barnard et al., 2000; Barnard, 
2004; Barnard & Bowman, 2003). Its particular form has been validated in only a limited range of 
experimental tests, and it remains a long way from being a fully mature “explanatorily adequate” 
theory. The fact that it has been applied across the domains of attention, language, memory, as well as 
meanings in cognition and emotion nonetheless provides some confidence of its potential descriptive 
range.  Conceptually, it is also important to note that re-configurations of mental architecture bring a 
package of emergent properties rather than isolated features that engender specific evolutionary 
advantages. In the specific context of debates concerning the fundamental properties of musical 
meaning, the layered framework of systems analysis shown in Figure 1, at least enables us to address 
some of the key challenges laid out by Cross and Tolbert (2009).  
One challenge specifically related to a need for multiple theoretical perspectives and methods 
for addressing meaning. The analysis of mental architecture suggested here makes claims about how 
meaning is encoded and abstracted from sensory experience. A macro-theory of mental architecture 
constrains but does not determine what is and isn’t meaningful in a specific culture. Hence the layered 
framework of systems analysis of Figure 1 assigns the problem of specifying cultural meanings to 
macro-theory and micro-theory in behavioural architectures rather than mental ones - along with their 
methods for analysing social and physical interactions in real-world contexts. What a macro-theory of 
mental architecture should help us to achieve is systematic development work on the diverse and rather 
dendritic aspects of the problem of specifying cognitive and affective attributes of musical meanings. 
All of the components of the nine-subsystem architecture would be recruited in one way or 
another when listening to music, making music, just talking about it or even teaching it. Musical 
performance, be it instrumental or vocal, relies on highly practiced expertise in either articulatory or 
skeletal effector subsystems as well as the feedback of visual auditory, and body state components to 
the multimodal subsystems. Actions must be accurately selected and titrated, sequenced, timed with 
suprasegmental features being generated and monitored. The specific macro-theory proposed here, and 
provided with the kind of evolutionary justification requested by Cross and Tolbert (2009), has quite 
specific and potentially testable, ramifications for our understanding of musical meaning. 
The opening remarks drew attention to the idea that musical meanings most readily related to 
implicational rather than propositional meanings. The evolutionarily grounded argument now enables 
more precision to be given to the idea that meanings in music are best seen as the communication and 
appreciation of the contents of latent implicational schemata that are realised in interactions with 
multiple components of mental architecture, including propositional meanings.  
As should be clear from their evolutionary origins, the nature and origins of implicational 
representations directly confront the issue of why music is significant, linked both to affect and direct 
perception of physical states of the world and body, while remaining “hard to pin down” conceptually. 
The original elaboration of the concept of implicational meanings, as applied to depressive 
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psychopathology and how it differs from propositional meanings (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993), closely 
mirror the aspects of debates about musical meanings. Teasdale and Barnard note that forms like 
poetry, metaphor and parable more accurately capture the rich yet latent high dimensionality of 
implicational meanings. As one thought experiment they took some well-known poetry and translated 
it into an alternative “propositional form” matched phrase by phrase. 
So the lines from La Belle Dame Sans Merci (Keats): 
 
“Oh what can ail thee knight at arms,  
Alone and palely loitering?  
The sedge has wither’d from the lake,  
And no birds sing” 
 
becomes the prose: 
 
What is the matter armed old-fashioned soldier,  
standing by yourself and doing nothing with a pallid expression?  
The reed-like plants have decomposed by the lake  
and there are not any birds singing. 
 
While the actual individual phrases map reasonably well one on to another, the poetry conveys 
a sense of haunting loneliness not shared by the “prose” translation. The two texts express the same 
propositional meanings but different implicational schemata. 
Of course poetry, metaphor and parable largely depend on the subsystems that deal with 
spoken or written language. But the architecture of Figure 5 provides means of distinguishing 
alternative routes to meaning. Eight of the nine subsystems in this Figure are no more than one 
processing stage away from direct sensation or effector control.  Mental processing within these 
subsystems is inherently linked to first order abstractions of stuff that behaves either out there in the 
world or within the body itself. The exception is the Propositional subsystem. This form of meaning 
receives no inputs that are necessarily constrained by the first order derivatives of stuff co-present out 
there in the world or in the body. It communicates only with other central subsystems and controls the 
form and content of imagery in the mind – very much like the central executive in Baddeley’s classic 
model of working memory acts to controls a phonological loop and visuo-spatial scratch pad across a 
range of disembodied cognitive “tasks” (see Baddeley, 2007).  
Whilst we can talk “about” musical meaning in propositions or recruit abstract structural 
description of vocal or spatial-praxic phrases, the experience of music is thus arguably more closely 
allied to implicational schemata. Such implicational schemata encapsulate “embodied” dimensions. 
They also directly control visceral, somatic and other globally patterned responses (see Figure 5). As 
noted previously such schemata are directly constrained by distal visual and auditory patterns that 
optionally link ideas to affect. When synthesised with the products of propositional meanings 
implicational schemata can encapsulate abstract model of self, the world and others.  
This form of synthesis thus also provides a basis for addressing known empirical phenomena 
and making new predictions. In particular, it provides a clear basis for explaining phenomena such as 
entrainment or social contagion (e.g. see Clayton, Sager & Will, 2004) as well as the latent effects of 
background music on purchasing behaviour in supermarkets (e.g. see Milliman, 1982). Although much 
music is familiar, the interaction between implicational schemata and propositional meanings supports 
innovation. This central engine of ideation could be argued to provide a route for developing more 
precise ideas about the basis of musical creativity or evaluative criticism.  
In the broader context of the nine-subsystem architecture, theories of both language and music 
would necessitate at least some reference to both forms of meaning. However, the analysis of language 
behaviours is inherently linked to the communication of propositional content. It is used when 
referentially specific attributes need to be pinpointed to guide one’s own behaviour or the behaviour of 
others. In contrast, key aspects of music, dance and art may function not so much to pinpoint 
referentially specific meanings but to draw participants into a region of particular senses of meaning or 
to feel affect and knowing about some broad region of “deep stuff.” Such senses of meaning may serve 
a whole variety of personal and social functions. Importantly, propositional meaning emerged to 
support the sharing specific meanings in a manner that can be devoid of affect. Implicational meanings, 
on the other hand, are inherently generic. Since they are felt senses of an individual’s existential state in 
a real world context and with a particular body state in place, such senses of meaning are inherently 
situated and “subjective.”  Indeed, the deep meanings of music may resist detailed description and 
sharing precisely because this property holds. 
The kind of formulation outlined here is self-evidently far short of a fully-fledged theory. It is 
a sketch that would require multiple cognitive and affective “properties” of the type discussed in the 
context of Figure 3 (Takete & Ulumoo/ affiliation and antagonism) to be tested and worked out with 
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detailed analyses of a range of musical forms. The expert knowledge required is beyond that possessed 
by the current author. However, in the wider spirit of interdisciplinary dialogue, it is hoped that the 
very ideas of roles for well-specified macro-theory and two qualitatively distinct forms of meaning can 
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